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The United States and global capital
markets
Joseph P. Daniels

INTRODUCTION
During the Bretton Woods period, central banks were responsible for maintaining pegged exchange values thereby reducing exchange rate risk and currency
arbitrage opportunities. The existence of significant capital controls made sovereign governments and international agencies the primary source of official
development financing. The ad hoc system of flexible exchange rates that
emerged in 1973 through 1976 resulted in a transfer of exchange rate risk, and
arbitrage opportunities, from government agencies to the private sector. The
dismantling of capital controls and deregulation of domestic financial sectors
signalled a willingness of governments to substitute private sector financing for
official financing by domestic governments and international agencies.
Liberalization of capital markets, along with increased international transactions in the real sector, have spurred dramatic growth in the international
money and capital markets. (See Williamson and Mahar (1998) for an excellent essay on financial liberalization.) Daily foreign exchange transactions,
for example, have grown to nearly $1.4 trillion. This growth highlights the
importance of today's capital markets in allocating savings worldwide. By
channelling savings to borrowers, capital market institutions help finance
domestic investment and direct savings, whether it be domestically and globally, to their most efficient use, allowing savers to achieve higher risk
adjusted rates of return. Access to global capital markets allows borrowers to
pursue investment projects in times of domestic downturns, thus reducing
domestic business cycles (Eichengreen et al., 1999). In light of recent financial
crises, however, many observers have come to question the benefits of uninhibited international capital flows and its contribution to real sector investment.
Eatwell and Taylor (1998) argue that the performance of the financial
sector must ultimately be judged on its contribution to the real sector in terms
of long-run trends in employment and growth. In this regard they make two
important observations. First, trend growth of the G7 economies has slowed
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to two-thirds of the rate posted in the 1960s. Second, there is disagreement as
to whether the performance of financial institutions affects medium or
long-term trend performance of the real sector or if it is determined solely by
structural aspects of the real sector.
It is assumed here that the performance of capital markets and financial
institutions is important for real sector outcomes as it affects public and
private sector behaviour. Hence, a solvent and sound system of financial
institutions may promote continued domestic growth and prosperity. Under
unstable conditions, however, intermediaries may channel capital flows in a
way that 'undermine domestic policies' (Crockett, 1997, p. 7), triggering a
financial crisis.
The potential costs of these financial crises is abundant. For example, it is
believed that the costs of the 1980s banking crises in Argentina equalled
one-half of the nation's GDP while the United States' bailout of banks during
the early 1990s totalled at least $200 billion. The 1995 real estate collapse in
Japan resulted in the non-performance of more than $250 billion in bank
loans. In South Korea more than 10 per cent of all bank loans are
non-performing. For India and China non-performing loans are estimated to
be nearly 20 per cent of outstanding loans. Since 1980, the IMF estimates
that 133 of 181 IMF member nations have suffered banking problems it
considers to be 'significant' (Lindgren et aI., 1996).
Further, as has been seen in recent financial crises, banking solvency is
critical to the operation and stability of the global economy as well. How
should sovereign governments and international organizations respond to this
issue? One view is that financial intermediation is inherently an unstable
business the fortunes of which rise and fail with the business cycle. Hence,
government regulation and safety nets are required to prevent periodic banking collapses. Another view is that safety nets themselves create a moral
hazard problem and may actually be responsible for recent banking crises.
Regardless of the view taken, it is important to ensure that global capital
markets operate as efficiently as possible. As capital markets become more
integrated internationally, therefore, the need for stability, solvency and regulation becomes paramount as financial crises can be magnified.
This chapter considers these issues, focusing on institutions, market structure and growth, and risk. The next section considers the basic rationales for,
and characteristics of, financial intermediation with attention given to the
unique characteristics of the United States in financing capital investment
projects. The section after that highlights recent developments in world financial markets, distinguishing between the money and capital markets, and
examines the most important development, the increase in capital flows to
developing markets. The next section explores various sources of risks and
examines opposing views on regulation, presents recent attempts and propos-
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als for global regulation and questions whether new or old institutions are
best suited to supervise intermediation. The final section offers a conclusion.

RATIONALES FOR, AND CHARACTERISTICS OF,
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
Financial transactions can be direct or indirect. For example, households may
allocate wealth to the purchase of a bond issued by a company, effectively
making a direct loan to that business. In this way, households assist in the
direct finance of domestic capital investment projects. It is also possible that
a household may obtain a long-term time deposit at a banking firm. In turn,
the bank may allocate these funds, together with those of other deposit
holders, to holdings of bonds issued by the same company as before. In this
instance, the household would indirectly finance domestic capital investment.
The bank, in turn, intermediates the financing of the domestic investment.
The process of indirect finance, or financial intermediation, is the most common way in which funds are channelled from saving to investment and· the
financial institutions that fulfil this role are called financial intermediaries.

The Rationales for Domestic and International Financial Intermediation
One rationale for the use of intermediaries is the existence of asymmetric
information. Often lenders are not privy to all of the pertinent information
about the borrower and the investment project, particularly information about
risk. The existence of asymmetric information can lead to adverse selection,
or the potential for those who desire funds for unworthy projects to be the
most likely to want to borrow or to issue debt instruments. A result of adverse
selection is that the issuance of poor-quality instruments can make savers less
willing to lend to or hold debt instruments issued by those seeking to finance
high-quality projects. Also, poor market information or uncertainty about the
competence of the financial intermediaries' market may result in herding
behaviour; that is, when savers follow the behaviour of someone they feel is
better informed, leading to self-fulfilling outcomes. High-quality banking
institutions may minimize herding behaviour by depositors.
A third problem that financial market participants face is moral hazard.
Moral hazard is the potential that, after they have access to funding, a borrower might engage in behaviour that increases risk - or, in other words, the
'immoral' behaviour, from the lender's perspective, that the borrower would
thereby have exhibited. Moral hazard is the primary argument used against
the recent financial support arrangements offered by the IMF and G7 nations,
and used to argue in favour of debt restructuring schemes that involve private
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sector bondholders. Another important reason for agents to use financial
intermediaries is economies of scale. Financial intermediaries make it possible for individuals to pool funds together, increasing the scale of possible
opportunities. In addition, this centralization of management can reduce the
average fund management costs below the level an individual would incur.
Financial intermediaries, therefore, exist to save holders of financial instruments from incurring risks and allow them to enjoy reduced costs as described
above. While these institutions cannot eliminate adverse selection, herding
behaviour and moral hazard problems, they can collect information, at a
lower marginal cost, about the underlying riskiness of financial instruments
and monitor the continuing performance of those who issue such instruments,
thereby reducing the extent of adverse selection and moral hazard problems
in the market for these bonds.
The rationales for international financial intermediation are the same as for
domestic intermediation. For example, asymmetric-information problems are
likely to be at least as severe when evaluating the riskiness of foreign financial instruments as compared to domestic instruments, and therefore the need
for international financial intermediation is greater. Banks located in various
countries take part in the process of international financial intermediation by
using some of the funds of domestic deposit holders to finance loans to
individuals and companies based in other nations. Most of this international
banking activity takes place in the Eurocurrency markets. Today, very few
nations ' capital investment projects are purely domestically financed. Even
bank-financed investment in the United States increasingly stems from loans
by non-US banks, with the largest US corporations on average using the
services of more foreign banks as compared with the average number of
domestic institutions whose services they utilize.
As shown in Table 7.1, the world 's largest banking institutions, sometimes
referred to as 'megabanks', tend to be located outside of the United States.
By increasing their asset portfolios through regional or world-wide expansion, megabanks may reduce average operating costs, gaining efficiency. The
evidence for economies of scale in banking is more mixed for US banks than
for their European counterparts, even though US bank managers themselves
commonly offer economies of scale as a key rationale for large-scale mergers
in the United States.

National Characteristics of Intermediation
There are several ways in which countries' banking systems and the use of
banks and market finance differ. The first is the extent to which domestic
firms use foreign banks relative to domestic banks. US multinationals tend to
rely on foreign banking institutions to intermediate investment projects to a

158

Table 7.1

Globalizing America

The largest banks

Bank
Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank
Deutsche Bank AG
Sumitomo
Credit Suisse Group
HSBC Holdings
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank
SanwaBank
Credit Agricole Mutuel
Fuji Bank
ABN Amro Holdings

Country

Assets (US$ billions)

Japan
Germany
Japan
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Japan
Japan
France
Japan
The Netherlands

580
484
474
471
433
428
420
414
412

692

Note : Based on total assets held on 31 December 1997.
Source: American Banker, 6 August 1998.

much higher degree than multinationals of other nations. By the 1990s, for
example, a typical multinational US finn had accounts with at least as many
banks abroad as they maintained with US-based banking institutions.
Another aspect in which national banking systems differ concerns the
extent to which banks are the predominant means by which firms finance
their working capital needs. For instance, British, German and Japanese
businesses use bank loans to finance significantly larger shares of their investment as compared with businesses located in the United States. In the
United Kingdom, nearly 70 per cent of funds raised by businesses typically
stem from bank borrowings. The proportions for Germany and Japan were of
the order of 50 per cent and 65 per cent, respectively. In contrast, US businesses normally raise fewer than 30 per cent of their funds through bank
loans. This difference helps to explain why German and Japanese banks more
than doubled their size between the 1970s and the 1990s. Though British
banks grew by less in relative terms, their importance in British business
finance permitted them to grow faster than US banks, whose overall size,
adjusted for inflation, failed to change significantly in the two decades following the 1970s.
There also are differences in market structures across nations. In particular,
the extent of potential rivalry, often measured by the portion of total deposits
concentrated within a nation's largest banks, can vary considerably. The top
five banks in Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain
and the United Kingdom have over 30 per cent of the deposits of their
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nations' residents. In Greece and the Netherlands, this figure is over 80 per
cent. In contrast, the top five US banks account for fewer than 15 per cent of
the deposit holdings of US residents. With regard to total bank assets, the US
banking system also appears to exhibit more potential for rivalry among its
banks, as less than a third of total bank assets are concentrated among the top
ten US banks. In Gennany, Japan and the United Kingdom, this figure is
about two-thirds.
The degree of banking competition within a nation also depends on how
open the nation's borders are to rivalry from foreign-based banking operations. By the early 1990s, foreign banks made many loans to US individuals
and firms, but foreign banks had barely penetrated the German and Japanese
loan markets. This undoubtedly has played a role in producing the high levels
of bank asset concentration in Europe and Japan, as shown in Table 7.1.
Another feature that distinguishes national banking systems is the extent to
which they permit universal banking, under which there are few if any limits
on the ability of banks to offer full ranges of financial services and to own
equity shares in corporations. In Gennany and the United Kingdom, as well
as in several other European nations, banks face few such restrictions. Japanese banks face greater restrictions on their activities, but many Japanese
banks have the authority to underwrite stocks and bonds. By contrast, in the
United States universal banking has been prohibited since 1933, when the US
Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act. There has been little evidence that
banks in nations with universal banking are significantly more risky than
their US counterparts; one of the common arguments against universal banking. The purchase of Bankers Trust by Deutsche Bank in 1998 highlights how
disadvantaged US banks are internationally and helped put the removal of the
Glass-Steagall Act back on the congressional agenda in 1999.
The legal environment, the level of diversification and the degree of competition are characteristics which are highly interdependent, making it difficult
to delineate the cause and effect of market outcomes. The result for the
United States is that US firms rely on foreign banks to a greater extent than
do their foreign counterparts, yet rely on bank financing to a significantly
lesser degree overall. Some nations protect their banking industries to a
higher degree while allowing them to compete in a broader range of services.
The German and Japanese systems of banks, therefore, tend to have fewer
institutions, each with a much larger degree of market concentration.
Some key observations can be made at this point. First, soundness of
domestic banking systems is important for the efficient channelling of savings to productive investment projects, and for the heavy costs that banking
crises can entail. Second, because US firms rely on foreign banking institutions to such a high degree, the soundness and solvency of foreign banks is
important to US business managers and policy-makers. Finally, because of
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the extent to which US firms rely on direct intermediation to finance investment projects, managers and policy-makers must be concerned with the
reliability and stability of domestic and global capital markets.
In regard to the first observation, the questions faced by US policy-makers
are: to what extent should concentration be allowed, at the risk of reduced
domestic competition; what services should banks be allowed to compete in;
and what, if anything, should be done to enhance the global competitiveness
of US banking institutions. To some degree these have been answered, as
technological advancements, deregulation efforts in the 1980s and increased
willingness for mergers and acquisitions have slowly eroded the restrictions
placed on US banks through dual-system regulations and the Glass-Steagall
Act. Now that these important financial institutions have been considered, we
next examine how global financial markets have evolved.

WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS
Following the end of World War II, the industrialized nations pursued a goal of
greater trade liberalization. Not until the 1970s, however, did most industrialized nations begin to liberalize financial markets. Changes in communications
technology combined with the introduction of innovative new financial instruments has moved even reluctant nations to liberalize and deregulate their
financial markets. The advent of instant and low-cost communications and
information innovations allows a wider range of firms and individuals to
participate in international financial markets and to manage their risk exposure more effectively. As a result, since the 1970s the growth of international
financial markets has far outpaced the growth of international trade in goods
and services. Savers, as discussed below, have yet to take full advantage of
these new opportunities. This stylized fact, combined with the usual econometric evidence on parity conditions, indicates that though capital markets
have become more integrated, they are far from perfectly integrated.
International Capital Markets

International capital markets are the markets for cross-border exchange of
financial instruments which have a maturity of a year or more, or with no
distinct maturity. Table 7.2 presents evidence on the dramatic growth of
issues in the international capital markets. Between 1986 and 1996 total
financing activity that took place on the international capital markets increased by $526.7 billion, or 219.6 per cent.
Table 7.2 separates the data into two of its most important components:
international bonds and international equities. A third component of the
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Total
Securities
Loans

161

Growth o/the international capital market (US$ billions)
1986

1997

Change

Percentage change

389.5
195.5
88.5

1769.3
916.7
390.4

1379.8
721.2
301.9

354.2
368.9
341.1

Source : Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Financial Market Trends.

international capital markets is foreign direct investment. The international
bond market, which represents 92 per cent of the international capital markets, experienced the greatest absolute growth, with an increase of $480.7
billion. The international equities market, on the other hand, experienced the
most rapid rate of growth with a fivefold increase over the lO-year period.
The impact of increased participation of institutional investors has been
given much attention of late. Deregulation, liberalization and the technological advances described earlier create a wider range of savings opportunities
for individuals through institutional investors. A recent study by the OECD
(1997) details the size and growth of financial instruments managed by institutional investors. Table 7.3 presents the OECD's data for the six nations with
the largest institutional investor activity. As shown, the United States and the
United Kingdom are two of the nations with the greatest amount of institutional investor activity. The table also shows that between 1990 and 1995 the
financial assets of institutional investors increased by one-third to one-half
for the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada.
Even though the development and growth of the international capital market allows individuals and businesses greater opportunities to manage risk
and increase potential returns, savers do not utilize the international capital

Table 7.3

Financial assets o/institutional investors (%GDP)

Canada
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States
Source:

1995

Percentage change 1990-95

87.9
2132.8
158.4
114.8
162.3
170.8

50.0
0
18.7
34.4
41.7
34.1

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Financial Market Trends .
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market to the extent we might expect. French and Poterba (1991) find that
savers demonstrate a low level of international diversification in their portfolios and that most corporate equity is held by domestic residents.
Table 7.4 provides estimates of equity portfolio weights for US , Japanese
and UK savers. French and Poterba also estimate the additional return that
savers must expect in order to justify the low level of international diversification. As the table shows, US savers hold almost 94 per cent of their
portfolios in domestic equities. The estimates of the return on an internationally diversified portfolio are compared with estimated returns on portfolios
with distributions comparable to British, Japanese and US investors. To justify the low level of international diversification, US savers must anticipate a
return on their domestic equity holdings that exceeds the actual return by
almost 1 per cent. UK savers, due to a smaller overall equity market, have the
most internationally diversified portfolios of the three nations. To justify 82
per cent of their portfolio in UK equities, however, UK savers must anticipate
a return on their domestic holdings that exceeds the actual return by more
than 4 per cent.

Table 7.4

Equity portfolio diversification (%)

United States
Japan
United Kingdom
France
Germany
Canada

United States

Japan

United Kingdom

93 .8
3.1
1.1
0.5
0.5
1.0

1.3
98.1
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1

5.9
4.8
82.0
3.2
3.5
0.6

Excess returns required to justify domestic share of equity portfolio
0.9
2.5
4.4
(as per cent)
Source : French and Poterba (1991).

French and Poterba conclude that these low levels of international diversification are not due to any national or institutional constraints. The three
countries in their study have few if any capital controls in place today, and
tax differences and transaction costs are also very small for these nations.
The authors conclude, therefore, that the low levels of diversification are due
to savers' tastes. They speculate that savers perceive a greater degree of risk
in foreign equity markets because they are less familiar with those markets
than they are with domestic equity markets.
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International Money Markets

International money markets are markets for cross-border exchange of financial instruments with a maturity of less than one year. Although traders
exchange a number of different types of instruments in international money
markets, foreign exchange instruments are most actively traded. As noted
earlier, the international capital markets have experienced considerable growth
since the early 1970s. The international money markets, however, have experienced astounding growth. Economists periodically estimate the volume of
transactions in the foreign exchange markets based on surveys of the largest
banks and foreign exchange trading firms . Current estimates of the daily
activity on the foreign exchange markets indicate that the daily turnover is
approximately $1.25 billion. On average, the daily volume of the foreign
exchange market approximates two months of activity that occurs in the New
York stock exchange market.
The international money markets are comprised of a number of financial
instruments other than spot and forward exchange contracts. These instruments include short-term international bank, government and corporate notes,
and international commercial paper. Because transactions among large banks
constitute the bulk of international money market exchanges, we can use
reports of these banks' cross-border asset and liability positions to estimate
the size of the market. Table 7.5 provides data on the cross-border positions
for December 1997 and the change in cross-border positions for the year
1997. As shown, reporting banks had over $8 trillion in both outstanding
assets and liabilities. The change in these positions for the year 1997 was
approximately $0.5 trillion.
Table 7.5 also shows the dominance of the industrialized countries' banks
in international money markets. Cross-border positions of the industrialized
countries represents over 78 per cent of the total. The dominance of the US
dollar, as discussed by Daniels and Davis in Chapter 9, is also apparent with
the dollar denominating over one-third of outstanding positions.
Capital Flows and Developing Economies

Arguably the most important feature of the international financial markets
is the increased volume of financial flows between nations. Indeed, the
most striking feature of the 1990s is the increased volume of flows to the
emerging countries. Figure 7.1 illustrates the rise in total net private capital
flows for the emerging economies, distinguishing between official net direct investment flows and portfolio flows. As shown in the figure, net
private capital flows to the emerging economies have risen a dramatic 415
per cent.
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Table 7.5

Reporting banks' cross-border positions, December 1997 (US$
billions)

December 1997

Estimated change

Assets
Industrial countries
US dollar
Other currencies
All other countries
Total

7123.6
3178.1
3945.5
1914.7
9038.3

1019.4
461.3
558.1
137.3
1156.7

Liabilities
Industrial countries
US dollar
Other currencies
All other countries
Total

6948.7
3215.7
3733.0
1892.2
8840.9

963.6
419.3
544.3
183.2
1146.9

Source:

Bank for International Settlements.

As learned from the 1994-95 Mexican financial crisis, it is important to
recognize the proportion of net private capital flows that are portfolio investment. Portfolio investment, often referred to as 'hot money', can reverse
direction quickly, leaving a nation's financial sector in an illiquid position.
(See Chang and Velasco (1998) for an excellent review of the Asian liquidity
problem.) Figure 7.1 shows that for the emerging economies, the proportion
of net portfolio investment increased from 1990 through 1994, representing a
sizable overall proportion in 1993 and 1994. Much of this is reflected in
portfolio flows to the Western Hemisphere, or countries such as Mexico,
Brazil and Argentina. The sizable decline in portfolio flows in 1995 is also
reflected in the Western Hemisphere data as these flows reversed following
the Mexican financial crisis, resulting in a drop of $68.3 million in 1995
alone, representing a 112 per cent decline and overall negative net portfolio
flows for the region.
Figure 7.1 also illustrates that the proportion of net portfolio flows to total
private capital flows differs widely across the various regions. For the Middle
East and Europe, net portfolio flows account for 42 per cent of total private
flows, while it is a mere 8 per cent for the transitional economies. Net direct
foreign investment flows as a percentage of total net private flows range from
58 per cent for the transitional economies to a scant 7 per cent for the Middle
East and European economies.
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RISK AND REGULATION
As described above, the growth and globalization of financial markets and
institutions has brought about a vast number of new opportunities for savers
and borrowers. It has, however, also generated new risks and magnified
existing risk potential. The four types of risk considered here, in the context
of globalization and technological advance in financial instruments, are:
Herstatt risk, legal risk, operational risk and systemic risk. There are a number
of other types of risk that could be explored, such as liquidity risk and
settlement risk, but these would be beyond the confines of this chapter.
Hence, only the most obvious sources are discussed, in brief.
Risk

More than two decades ago the impact of Herstatt Risk, or settlement risk that
spans time zones or systemic risk, was felt. In 1974, German banking regulators closed the failed Herstatt Bank at 3.30 p.m., after the bank had received
European foreign exchange payments but before it made required payments to
US banks. Because the US banks did not receive their anticipated payments,
they were, in many cases, unable to fulfil their own obligations. By the time the
entire event unwound, US banks had lost as much as $200 million dollars.
Systemic risk, settlement or credit risk that spills over and effects third
parties, has been a significant concern following the Mexican crisis of 1994
and the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. An important aspect of increased
globalization is the transmission of shocks and the potential for contagion. As
financial markets become more integrated, the transmission of shocks becomes possible and can even be magnified. Such was the case in the US stock
market crash of the 1980s. Because of intertwined markets, the crash spilled
into exchanges across the globe.
As demonstrated in the previous section, there has been a dramatic increase in short-term portfolio flows, particularly to the emerging economies.
Many of these emerging nations have financial and banking sectors that are
underdeveloped, not regulated and not properly supervised. When positive,
these net inflows can put upward pressure on a nation's currency and on
domestic inflation. On the other hand, they also represent a lower-cost fonn
of financing, hence lower interest rates, and stimulate a nation 's economy.
Portfolio flows can, however, reverse direction at rates that quickly exhaust
the cumulative buildup of years of inflows. In an economy with an underdeveloped financial sector, these outflows may result in an illiquid banking
system and put downward pressure on the nation 's currency. Under a fixed
exchange rate regime, the government is faced with opposing problems: the
banking system needs additional liquidity while the exchange rate regime
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Figure 7.1

Net private capital flows to emerging economies, 1990-96

requires higher interest rates. These hot money flows appear to occur regionally
as opposed to nationally, with one country serving as the trigger for a regional crisis (Mexico and Thailand, for example). This is the type of problem
seen in the recent financial and currency crises (see Glick (1998) for a survey
of the literature in this area). Empirical work by Glick and Rose (1998)
indicates that currency crises affect regions or 'clusters' of nations through
international trade channels.
As the financial markets have evolved, new and highly sophisticated financial instruments have been introduced. The use of these instruments often
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becomes widespread before appropriate domestic regulators and corporate
managers fully understand their risks and benefits, thereby increasing operational, or management risk, and legal risk, the risk that the contract cannot be
enforced by a legal body. The 1995 collapse of Barings Bank illustrates
operational risk. The same day that Peter Baring had to ask the Bank of
England to intervene, and the day after the trader involved in the derivatives
fiasco, Nick Leeson, faxed in his resignation, Barings was to announce and
award company bonuses, including a bonus to Leeson in the amount of
£450,000. The total losses to Barings is estimated to be £927 million. (See
Kuprianov (1995) for case studies on Barings PLC and Metallgesellschaft
AG.)
A final aspect considered here is the impact of increased globalization,
competition and technological advances on bank structure. Regulatory arbitrage,
the practice of establishing foreign offices to avoid domestic regulation, has
increased dramatically due in part to technological advances in banking. Globalization and competition have led to increased merger activity and the creation
of 'mega' banks. Both activities undermine the attempts of sovereign governments to regulate and supervise national banking institutions.
Global Regulation

How should sovereign governments and international organizations respond
to the risks of increasing financial integration? It is important first to distinguish between international financial liberalization and financial regulation.
Liberalization is the opening up of the financial market to foreign participants, increasing competition and opportunities for domestic banks. Regulation
is the governing of the financial sector in order to improve its operation of
financial intermediation. Obviously, and as evident in the recent financial
crises, appropriate regulation and supervision is important for the domestic
financial system to absorb and channel in an economically efficient way the
inflows and outflows of capital that result from financial liberalization.
Views of government intervention
One view of government intervention in the financial sector is that financial
intermediation is inherently an unstable business the fortunes of which rise
and fall with the business cycle and that financial markets may have inherent
imperfections. Hence, government regulation and safety nets are required to
prevent periodic banking collapses.
In line with this view, Von Hagen and Fratianni (1998) identify three main
reasons for financial regulation. The first is that small depositors find it too
costly to continuously monitor the activities of intermediaries. Hence, small
depositors need protection from the risk of bank failure. The second is that
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regulation is required to prevent large withdrawals from one bank that might
affect the entire industry, or to prevent contagion. The final reason is to
preserve the integrity of the payments system. The authors assert that these
types of banking regulation involve the reallocation of risk and therefore
wealth among market participants. In a global setting this reallocation can
become quite complex as sovereign governments wish to protect domestic
residents over foreign residents.
Another view is that regulation that eliminates competition, and the existence of safety nets, creates a moral hazard problem and may actually be
responsible for recent banking crises. This second view has been used extensively to build a critical case against the necessity for international organizations
such as the IMF. It has played particularly well on the floor of the US Congress
which begrudgingly approved new funds to the IME
Regulation and supervision: new or old institutions?
In spite of recent criticism, there have been a number of well-placed initiatives and actions taken in response to the risks described above. Examples are
the Lamfalussy Report, a 1990 GlO initiative that outlined the legal responsibilities of any intermediary undertaking a large volume wire transfer; the
Basle Capital Accord for capital adequacy standards; cross-border banking
principles for consolidated supervision; risk management guidelines for derivatives trading and core principles for effective banking supervision.
Many of these initiatives resulted from G7 directives. The Halifax and
Lyon Summits, in particular, addressed the global financial situation. (See the
excellent volume by Kenen (1996) and the summary by the BIS (1999).
Directives to the IMF included a request to the IMF to develop procedures to
provide faster access to IMF credit with strengthened conditionality, to develop standards for data availability and to intensify surveillance beyond
Article IV policy reviews. The response was an emergency financing mechanism, the Special Data Dissemination Standards, and publication of Article
IV reviews for those countries wishing the reviews to be public.
The G 10 was asked to double the credit facilities available to the IMF and
to review procedures that might prevent or resolve financial crises. The G 10
responded with a new arrangement that doubled available IMF credit and, as
a first-step, conducted a survey of market participants and domestic regulations in numerous countries. Based on the results of the survey, the G10
emphasized market-based governance and that countries should not expect
bailouts the 'size of Mexico'.
Arguably most important, in regard to government intervention, is the
problem of IMF bailouts. As is frequently argued, unlimited IMF bailouts
increase the moral hazard of lending and borrowing activities. Jeffery Sachs
(1998, p. 24) argues that the IMF worked 'mightily and wrongheadedly' to
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make the world safe for 'naive 25-year-old investment bankers who do not
know much about world politics' . Bailouts such as that in East Asia should
cease.
Recent words of the G8, particularly at the Birmingham Summit, indicate
that nations should not expect unlimited bailouts. It appears, however, that
the IMF is continuing to approach problems as it has in the past, and thus
IMF actions say otherwise. It is vital that the 07/G8 formulate a coherent and
consistent approach to bailouts in future financial crises. The G7/G8 and the
IMF must break the expectations they helped create. It is disappointing that
the strongest statement the leaders could offer at the Birmingham Summit
was that, 'It is also important to ensure that the private sector plays a timely
and appropriate role in crises resolution.' US influence is strong in these
organizations and US officials need to play an activist role in setting the
agenda.
In the long term, policy-makers should rethink completely the role of and
even the necessity for the IMF and the World Bank. They must first realize
that the IMF is not technically equipped to deal with the types of financial
crises that occur in the post-Bretton Woods era. Due to the increased integration of capital markets, the current crises have been fast developing, financial
in nature and beyond the capacity of the fund and other existing international
organizations. As an example, the current IMF Manual For Country Economists states: 'A country will require IMF assistance when it is having balance
of payments difficulties or, in other words, when the normal inflow of external savings is not sufficient to finance its resource gap, which is defined as the
difference between domestic savings and domestic investment.'
In addition, the current approach to fund conditionality is counterproductive. Sachs (1998, p. 25), states that:
This process [conditionality1is out of hand. It has undermined political legitimacy
in dozens of developing countries, especially since the IMF is often happy to
conspire with governments to make end runs around parliaments in the interests
of ' reform'. The contents of IMF programmes are too flawed to be a standard of
good or poor performance. Markets realize this, so IMF programmes do less and
less to rally them.

Finally there must be further discussions on supervisory coordination.
Primarily an initiative of Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martin, the issue
should be expanded to include regulatory coordination in order to reduce
regulatory arbitrage. In contrast to the Martin initiative, however, this should
not lead to a new supranational body composed of governmental agents. It
should be delegated to an agency with the greatest comparative advantage,
perhaps the London Club or the Bank for International Settlements. None the
less it should be a market-based approach as has been pursued thus far, since
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in today's financial environment, operational risk is greater than market risk.
Bank management must therefore be involved.

CONCLUSION
Financial intermediaries play an extremely import role as they channel savings to borrowers and help finance domestic investment. The solvency of a
nation's system of banks is critical for the stable flow of capital and continued growth and prosperity. Unfortunately, history has shown that financial
systems and intermediaries are quite fragile. As one might suspect, given the
increase in international capital flows, very few national capital investment
projects are financed purely by domestic intermediaries. Given the heightened level of integration, a nation's system of intermediaries is now exposed
to new sources of risk. These risks must be measured and managed in a
global context, presenting challenges for financial managers and regulatory
authorities and creating a need for coordinated efforts. US policy-makers
should take an active role in ensuring that a market-based approach continues
to be pursued in addressing these challenges.
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